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733 
UNSOPHISTICATED WEALTH: RECONSIDERING 
THE SEC’S “ACCREDITED INVESTOR” 
DEFINITION UNDER THE 1933 ACT  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Paris Hilton almost certainly can purchase unregulated securities issued 
by hedge funds or other private investment vehicles. Although her training 
and sophistication in the field of high-stakes financial transactions may be 
limited, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or the 
“Commission”) would leave her to her own devices if she chose to invest 
in private offerings. On the other hand, assume Sheryl has an M.B.A. from 
Harvard and is a graduate of one of the country’s leading Ph.D. programs 
in financial systems analysis. After all of this schooling, Sheryl is long on 
debt and short on assets. She has several offers to work at the nation’s 
most prestigious investment brokerages. But if Sheryl wants to invest in a 
private offering, the SEC regulations will not allow it. Sheryl is barred 
from investing in private offerings because, unlike Paris Hilton, Sheryl 
does not have sufficient income or net worth to be an “accredited 
investor.” Though ironic, this hypothetical contrast demonstrates the 
current state of securities law in the United States. The apparent 
incongruity of this example warrants a closer examination of the SEC’s 
accredited investor definition and raises the question: is there a better 
way? 
The SEC regulates and oversees the purchase and sale of securities.1 
Under Section 4 of Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”)2 or Regulation 
D,3 promulgated under the 1933 Act, certain securities offerings are 
exempt from registration requirements, so long as certain offering 
conditions are met.4 One such condition is that investors participating in 
private offerings generally must be accredited.5 Under the current 
definition, an accredited investor is one “whose individual net worth, or 
joint net worth with that person’s spouse, at the time of his purchase 
 
 
 1. See generally LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION (4th 
ed. 2006). 
 2. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2000). 
 3. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.508 (2007). 
 4. Id. For information regarding the registration requirements for publicly offered securities, see 
infra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.  
 5. Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2007); Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2007); Rule 506, 17 
C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007); see also infra note 57. 
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exceeds $1,000,000,” or alternatively, one “who had an individual income 
in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income 
with that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years, 
[with] a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the 
current year.”6 Hedge funds, along with other private investment vehicles 
such as private equity funds, typically sell securities to accredited 
investors as one way of maintaining their exempt status.7  
On December 27, 2006, the Commission released proposed revisions to 
its accredited investor definition.8 The SEC drafted the proposed revisions 
with an eye toward providing additional investor protections in light of the 
increased number of investors who have achieved accredited investor 
status.9 To meet this goal, the Commission proposed a new category of 
accredited investor called the “accredited natural person,” which would 
apply to persons transacting in private investment vehicles under 
Regulation D10 and Section 4(6).11 The Commission specified that the 
accredited natural person had to meet “either the net worth or income test 
specified in rule 501(a) or rule 215 [sic], as applicable, and [own] at least 
$2.5 million in investments.”12 In connection with its December 27, 2006, 
 
 
 6. Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2007).  
 7. See infra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.  
 8. Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a); Securities Act Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 
(proposed Jan. 4, 2007). In addition to proposed revisions to the accredited investor definition, the 
Commission also considered a new antifraud rule for investment advisers to pooled investment 
vehicles, which was unanimously adopted on July 11, 2007. See SEC Press Release 2007-133, SEC 
Votes to Adopt Antifraud Rule Under Investment Advises Act (July 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-133.htm; Investment Adviser Act Release No. IA-2628, 72 
Fed. Reg. 44756 (Aug. 9, 2007).  
 9. Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400.  
 10. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.508 (2007). 
 11. Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 405. Section 4(6) is an exemption under the 
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77bbbb (2000)), 
for  
transactions involving offers or sales by an issuer solely to one or more accredited investors, 
if the aggregate offering price of an issue of securities offered in reliance on this paragraph 
does not exceed the amount allowed under section 77c(b) of this title, if there is no 
advertising or public solicitation in connection with the transaction by the issuer or anyone 
acting on the issuer’s behalf, and if the issuer files such notice with the Commission as the 
Commission shall prescribe. 
15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (2000). In Release No. 33-8766, the Commission noted that its proposed 
“[accredited natural person] definition would be the same for the purposes of section 4(6) and 
Regulation D private offerings.” Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 405 n.46. 
 12. Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 405 (emphasis added). Rule 215, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.215 (2007), part of the General Rules and Regulations promulgated under the 1933 Act, mirrors 
the Rule 501(a) definition for a natural person who is an accredited investor. See Frank A. Taylor, 
Jeffrey D. Pflaum & Kevin C. Flesch, The Issuance of Securities by Small and Growing Businesses: A 
Primer, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1375, 1399 n.112 (1996). An issuer seeking an offering exemption 
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release, the SEC issued a call for comments on the accredited natural 
person standard.13 In response, the SEC received numerous comment 
letters,14 both in support15 and in opposition.16  
On August 3, 2007, the Commission proposed additional revisions to 
the accredited investor definition.17 The SEC’s proposal included adding 
an “investments-owned standard” as an alternative means of establishing 
accredited investor status.18 Under this investments-owned standard, 
individuals and spouses with $750,000 in investments would be deemed 
accredited.19 The SEC also continued to consider its proposed accredited 
natural person definition.20 Similar to the earlier December 27, 2006, 
release, the Commission issued a call for comments and again received 
comment letters in support of21 and in opposition to its proposal.22 
 
 
based on Section 4(6) under the 1933 Act would define “accredited investor” based on the definition in 
Rule 215. See Jeffrey J. Hass, Small Issue Public Offerings Conducted Over the Internet: Are They 
“Suitable” for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 76 n.39 (1998). For additional information 
on Section 4(6) exemptions, see supra note 11.  
 13. Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400. 
 14. As of June 2007, the Commission had received “several hundred comment letters on the 
proposals.” Rita M. Molesworth, SEC Proposes New Rules Directed At Hedge Funds And Their 
Advisers–Part II, THE METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., June 2007, at 37. 
 15. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Keith F. Higgins, Chair, Committee on Federal Regulation of 
Securities, American Bar Association (Mar. 12, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/ s7-
25-06/s72506-584.pdf (“We believe that updating qualification standards originally adopted in 1982 is 
appropriate and commend the Commission’s efforts in this regard.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Matt Motley (Mar, 16, 2007), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-605.htm (“I am a commodity trader by profession who qualified 
under the previous rules but would miss the cut under the new rules. . . . I have no need to have the 
SEC save me from myself. This is elitist and completely unnecessary. Please reconsider.”). 
 17. Securities Act Release No. 33-8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 45116 (proposed Aug. 10, 2007). In 
addition to the proposed revisions to the accredited investor definition relating to individuals and their 
spouses, the Commission proposed an “investments-owned” standard for entities and inflation 
adjustments to the dollar-amount thresholds in Rule 501 on a going-forward basis. Id. at 45117. The 
Commission also articulated a new proposed Rule 507, which would exempt offers and sales of 
securities only to “large accredited investors.” Under the new proposed Rule 507, limited advertising 
would be permitted. Id. at 45117–18. In addition, the SEC proposed a “bad actor” disqualification rule, 
which would preclude habitual offenders from conducting private offerings for a certain period 
depending on the egregiousness of the conduct leading to the disqualification. Id. at 45130. 
 18. Id. at 45117. 
 19. Id. at 45123. 
 20. Id. at 45116. 
 21. Id.; see, e.g., Comment Letter from Karen Tyler, NASAA President and Commissioner 
(October 26, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-07/s71807-57.pdf (“NASAA 
supports the adoption of an ‘investments-owned’ element in the accredited investor definition. Such a 
test may more accurately assess whether an investor is presumptively financially sophisticated and 
capable of assuming the risk of an investment in a private securities offering.”). 
 22. Release No. 33-8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 45116; see, e.g., Comment Letter from Sheldon M. Jaffe 
(Oct. 29, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-07/s71807-59.pdf (“The proposed 
amendment to Rule 501 will simply serve as an additional license for promoters to prey upon the 
elderly.”). 
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In light of this disagreement among commentators over how to revise 
the current accredited investor definition, a reexamination of the definition 
is necessary. Reconsideration is also relevant given legal criticisms of the 
current standard,23 as well as the perceived deficiencies in proposed 
scholarly alternatives to the current accredited investor definition.24 
Finally, the need for this review is heightened by the tremendous growth 
of the hedge fund industry over the past two decades25 and the projection 
that hedge fund assets will likely exceed $1 trillion in the next five to ten 
years.26 This Note reexamines the current accredited investor definition 
and proposes a licensing scheme to supplement the current definition.  
Part II of this Note provides a history of the 1933 Act, Regulation D 
and the accredited investor standard. Part II also details the need for 
change in the current accredited investor standard by explaining the 
evolving financial landscape, presenting scholarly criticisms of Regulation 
D, and examining proposed alternatives to the current definition. Part III 
surveys the problems with the current wealth-based accredited investor 
regime and details the shortcomings of existing scholarly alternatives. 
 
 
 23. Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
279 (2000); C. Edward Fletcher III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1988 
DUKE L.J. 1081; Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in 
Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291 (1994); Manning Gilbert Warren III, A 
Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities 
Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 382 (1984); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge 
Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975. See also infra 
notes 108–25 and accompanying text.  
 24. See Choi, supra note 23; Fletcher, supra note 23; Friedman, supra note 23; see also infra 
notes 126–59 and accompanying text. 
 25. According to estimates, “hedge fund assets grew from $50 billion in 1993 to $592 billion in 
2003, an increase of 1084 percent.” SEC STAFF REPORT, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE 
FUNDS, STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1 n.4 
(2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC STAFF 
REPORT]. In addition to the tremendous growth of the industry’s assets, the number of hedge fund 
firms has also experienced significant growth: 3,307 firms in 2004, up 74 percent from 1,903 in 1999. 
Jenny Anderson & Riva D. Atlas, If I Only Had a Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2005, at B1.  
 In 2008, the American economy began experiencing a significant economic crisis, which some 
commentators have stated may be the “deepest crisis since the Great Depression.” Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Leaders Move Toward Meeting on Economic Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at A30. 
Amid the economic crisis, hedge funds have been doing comparatively better than their counterparts in 
the mutual fund industry, but the hedge fund industry has still experienced losses: approximately $180 
billion in losses during a three-month period in the summer and fall of 2008. Louise Story, Investors 
Flee as Hedge Fund Woes Deepen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at A1. Further, as the economic crisis 
continues, many hedge fund investors are rushing to redeem their investments, which has led funds to 
sell large amounts of stock to meet investor redemption demands. Id. While the current economic 
crisis likely will have a significant impact on the hedge fund industry going forward, it is too early and 
beyond the scope of this Note to comment upon the potential effect of the economic crisis on hedge 
funds and hedge fund regulation.  
 26. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at vii. 
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Ultimately, Part IV proposes a licensing scheme which would supplement 
the current accredited investor definition. This system incorporates two 
different licensing exams: one for those natural persons who are accredited 
investors under the current definition, and one for those natural persons 
who are currently unaccredited. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of Regulation D 
Congress passed the 1933 Act in the aftermath of the Stock Market 
Crash of 1929, during the early years of the Great Depression.27 With the 
1933 Act, Congress attempted to regulate the offer and sale of securities, 
which previously had been regulated by a patchwork of state laws.28  
The purpose of the 1933 Act, as stated in its preamble, is “[t]o provide 
full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate 
commerce and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent 
frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes.”29 The legislative 
histories of the 1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
“1934 Act”)30 reflect concerns that investors participating in the financial 
markets were not sufficiently protected against inadequate disclosure, 
misrepresentation, and manipulative schemes.31 Congress feared that if 
investors were victimized as a result of insufficient market safeguards, 
they would lose confidence in the financial markets.32 The Commission 
attempted to implement safeguards to prevent loss of investor confidence 
 
 
 27. See LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 1, at 254–57.  
 28. Id. at 233–34. For additional information on the inadequacy of state regulation prior to the 
enactment of the 1933 Act, see Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate 
Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 18–28 (1983).  
 29. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74.  
 30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a to 78mm (2000)). While the 1933 Act is concerned with the offering process, the 1934 Act 
concerns secondary trading. The 1934 Act has four purposes: “to afford a measure of disclosure to 
people who buy and sell securities; to prevent and afford remedies for fraud in securities trading and 
manipulation of the markets; to regulate the securities markets; and to control the amount of the 
Nation’s credit that goes into those markets.” LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 1, at 328.  
 31. S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 3–4 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Item No. 17 
(J.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar eds., 1973).  
 32. See 77 CONG. REC. S2919 (May 1, 1933), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, supra note 31, at Securities Act of 
1933, Item No. 7. 
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and provide investors with adequate disclosure by implementing the 
mandatory use of registration statements for securities sold to the public.33  
The 1933 Act delineates two types of securities offerings: public 
offerings and private offerings.34 Public offerings of securities must be 
registered and approved by the Commission.35 In contrast, certain private 
offerings of securities are exempt from the 1933 Act’s registration 
requirements.36 The 1933 Act’s legislative history details that the private 
offering exemption allowed “an issuer to make a specific or an isolated 
sale of its securities to a particular person,” and was directed at 
transactions “where there [was] no practical need for [the bill’s] 
application or where the benefits [were] too remote.”37 Initially, 
exemptions were determined by examining a number of factors, such as 
the number of offerees and their relationship to each other and the issuer, 
the number of units offered, and the manner of the offering.38  
In 1953, the Supreme Court decided Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Ralston Purina Co.39 The SEC brought suit against Ralston 
Purina because the company sold unregistered common stock to its 
employees.40 Ralston Purina claimed that its employee stock sales were 
 
 
 33. LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 1, at 327. The use of registration statements and 
prospectuses, which are given to the buyer and summarize the information in the registration 
statement, were included as investor safeguards in the 1933 Act. See William O. Douglas & George E. 
Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 183 (1933). For an early critique of the 
1933 Act’s use of disclosure as an investor safeguard, see William O. Douglas, Protecting the 
Investor, 23 YALE REV. (n.s.) 521 (1934).  
 Today, registration statements are governed by Regulation C of the 1933 Act, and generally 
include information about the company’s business, the security offered, the company’s management, 
and the company’s financial statements. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.401–.479 (2007). The purpose of 
registration statements is to permit investors, not the Commission, to make informed judgments about 
purchasing securities. SEC, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, http://www.sec. 
gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Dec. 22, 2008). Registration statements are available publicly 
through the Commission’s EDGAR database on its website (www.sec.gov). See SEC, SEC Filings and 
Forms, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited Dec. 22, 2008). 
 34. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 
77bbbb (2000)). 
 35. For a general overview of the public offering process, see William K. Sjostrom Jr., The Due 
Diligence Defense Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 549, 556–65 
(2006).  
 36. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.508 (2007). 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, 15–16 (May 4, 1933), as reprinted in LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, 
supra note 1, at 1363.  
 38. LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 1, at 1363–65; see also Tom A. Alberg & Martin E. 
Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering Exemptions From 
Registration for the Sale of Securities, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 622, 624 (1974). 
 39. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).  
 40. Id. at 121. 
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exempt because the offerees were key employees.41 The Court recognized 
that the private offering exemption was ill-defined and attempted to clarify 
its scope.42 The Court looked to the 1933 Act’s legislative history 
regarding the private offering exemption, and held that “[s]ince exempt 
transactions are those as to which ‘there is no practical need for [the bill’s] 
application,’ the applicability of [the exemption] should turn on whether 
the particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act.”43 
After Ralston Purina, a private offering was “[a]n offering to those who 
are . . . able to fend for themselves.”44  
In the 1970s, financing via private offerings expanded,45 and the SEC 
and the judiciary struggled with the practicality and efficiency of 
determining investor suitability on a case-by-case basis.46 In response, the 
SEC enacted Rule 146 in 1974 to create an objective means to determine 
investor suitability.47 Under Rule 146, an issuer had to meet three 
requirements for an offering to be exempt from registration 
requirements.48 First, the issuer had to have a reasonable belief that the 
offeree was sophisticated, which was generally demonstrated by wealth or 
knowledge.49 Second, prior to completion of the sale, the issuer had to 
have a reasonable belief that the purchaser could assess the risks and 
merits of the offer, or that the purchaser had consulted a financial advisor 
and could bear the financial risks of the offer.50 Third, the issuer had to 
provide the offeree with the type of information that would be provided in 
a registration statement.51  
 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 122. 
 43. Id. at 125 (internal citations omitted). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of 
Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 274–25 (1990).  
 46. See, e.g., SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Henderson v. 
Hayden Stone Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int’l Franchises, Inc., 448 
F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971). One commentator noted that due to judicial uncertainty in the area of private 
offering exemptions, “reliance on the . . . exemption [was] a calculated business risk at best.” Julian M. 
Meer, The Private Offering Exemption Under the Federal Securities Act – A Study in Administrative 
and Judicial Contraction, 20 SW. L.J. 503, 512–13 (1966). 
 47. Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 4 SEC Docket 154 (Apr. 23, 1974). 
 48. Fletcher, supra note 23, at 1122–23. For more information on the Rule 146 requirements, see 
Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 38, at 633–34. 
 49. Fletcher, supra note 23, at 1122. 
 50. Id. at 1122–23. 
 51. Id. For more information detailing what information must be included in a registration 
statement, see supra note 33. 
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Rule 146 was not the panacea that the Commission hoped it would 
be.52 The rule resulted in compliance problems for small issuers who were 
uncertain whether the private offering exemption was available,53 
primarily because investor suitability was determined by subjective 
criteria.54 
In 1980, the SEC replaced Rule 146 with Rule 242.55 With the 
promulgation of Rule 242, the Commission intended to reduce the 
uncertainty of the offering exemption by implementing an objective means 
to determine investor suitability.56 Under Rule 242, issuers only needed to 
establish that a purchaser was an “accredited natural person” to exempt the 
offering from registration requirements.57 The Commission defined an 
accredited natural person as “any bank of the type whose securities are 
exempt from registration under the Securities Act of any insurance 
company, any registered investment company, or any Small Business 
Investment Company licensed by the Small Business Administration.”58 
 
 
 52. Securities Act Release No. 33-6121, 18 SEC Docket 287, 289 (Sept. 11, 1979). 
 53. Id.; see also Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 38, at 635–36 (foreseeing some of the potential 
problems for issuers, especially small issuers, under Rule 146). 
 54. Many commentators at the Commission’s small business hearings complained that under 
Rule 146, they were forced to make “subjective determination[s] as to the sophistication of each 
offeree and each purchaser.” Securities Act Release No. 33-6180, 19 SEC Docket 295, 297 (Jan. 17, 
1980). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. Under Rule 242, the exemption from registration requirements was applicable to offers to 
an “unlimited number of ‘accredited natural persons’” and no more than “35 other purchasers.” Id. at 
295. This is similar to Rules 505 and 506 under Regulation D, which limit the number of unaccredited 
purchasers in an exempt offering to thirty-five. Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2007); Rule 506, 17 
C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007). Under Rule 505, there is no requirement that purchasers be sophisticated. 17 
C.F.R. § 230.505. In contrast, under Rule 506, an issuer must reasonably believe that the unaccredited 
purchasers participating in the offering have “knowledge and experience in financial and business 
matters” and are “capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investments.” 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.506. Most privately offered investment pools rely on the Rule 506 exemption in their securities 
offerings, as the exemption is available without regard to the dollar amount of the offering. See 
Securities Act Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 404 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007). 
 While Rule 506 allows issuers to include up to thirty-five unaccredited investors in offerings, the 
Commission recognized that in practice, “most hedge funds sell only to investors whose wealth 
exceeds that required to meet the standard established for accredited investor status.” SEC STAFF 
REPORT, supra note 25, at x. For additional information regarding the realities of unaccredited 
investors participating in hedge fund private offerings, see Jacob Preiserowicz, The New Regulatory 
Regime for Hedge Funds: Has the SEC Gone Down the Wrong Path?, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 807, 815–16 (2006). Preiserowicz notes that while funds can accept unaccredited investors, “very 
few do so.” Id. at 815. The reason for this is that such unaccredited investors likely are not investing 
large amounts of capital, because “otherwise they would most likely fall within the accredited class.” 
Id. As such, it is generally not cost effective for hedge funds to produce the required disclosure 
materials that must distributed to unaccredited investors, in light of their small investments. Id. at 815–
16.  
 58. Release No. 33-6180, 19 SEC Docket 295, 298. 
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Certain employee plans also were included within the definition.59 The 
SEC eschewed a broader accredited person definition until it could 
“monitor the use of the Rule for an appropriate period” and then 
“reconsider whether to enlarge the class of institutions which may be 
categorized as accredited persons.”60  
The accredited person definition was, in fact, expanded when Congress 
added the accredited investor concept as part of the Small Business 
Investment Incentive Act of 1980.61 Congress defined an individual 
accredited investor as “any person who, on the basis of such factors as 
financial sophistication, net worth, knowledge, and experience in financial 
matters, or amount of assets under management qualifies as an accredited 
investor under rules and regulations which the Commission shall 
prescribe.”62  
In 1982, the SEC adopted Regulation D to “simplify and clarify 
existing exemptions, to expand their availability, and . . . to facilitate 
capital formation consistent with the protection of investors.”63 This 
supplanted the existing exemptions under Rules 146, 240 and 242.64 
Regulation D established three exemptions from the registration 
requirements under the 1933 Act: Rule 504 exempts offers and sales not 
exceeding $1,000,000;65 Rule 505 exempts offers and sales not exceeding 
 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 80 (2000)). Congress enacted the Small Business 
Investment Incentive Act “to enhance the ability of the SEC to assist small businesses in their efforts 
to compete in the capital marketplace.” Theodore Parnall, Bruce R. Kohl & Curtis W. Huff, Private 
and Limited Offerings After a Decade of Experimentation: The Evolution of Regulation D, 12 N.M. L. 
REV. 633, 670 (1982).  
 62. Small Business Investment Incentive Act § 603. 
 63. Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 24 SEC Docket 1166, 1166 (Mar. 8, 1982). 
 64. Id. The Commission rescinded Rules 146, 240 and 242 on June 30, 1982. Id. For information 
on Rule 146, see supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text. For information on Rule 242, see supra 
notes 55–60 and accompanying text. Rule 240 was adopted by the commission on March 15, 1975 
under Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act. Securities Act Release 33-5560, 6 SEC Docket 132, 132 (Jan. 24, 
1975). Rule 240 provided for an issuer exemption for small business issuers, “where, because of the 
small size and limited character of the offering, the public benefits of registration would be too 
remote.” Parnall, Kohl & Huff, supra note 61, at 654. The rule specified that offerings to fewer than 
100 beneficial owners, for less than $100,000 for any twelve-month period, were exempt from 
registration requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240(f) (1982). For additional information on Rule 240, see 
Parnall, Kohl & Huff, supra note 61, at 654–60.  
 65. Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2007). The relevant portions of Rule 504 read: 
To qualify for exemption under this [Rule 504], offers and sales must satisfy the terms and 
conditions of [Rule 501] and [502] (a), (c) and (d) . . . [and t]he aggregate offering price for 
an offering of securities under this [Rule] . . . shall not exceed $1,000,000, less the aggregate 
offering price for all securities sold within the twelve months before the start of and during 
the offering of securities under this [Rule].  
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$5,000,000;66 and Rule 506 exempts offers and sales without regard to 
dollar amount.67 In Rule 501, the Commission also adopted certain 
definitions, terms and conditions that are applicable throughout the 
regulation.68 Included within the regulation’s definitions was the term 
“accredited investor,” which the Commission characterized as “an 
expansion of the term ‘accredited person’ in Rule 242.”69 Regarding 
natural people, the Commission adopted two accredited investor 
definitions: one based on net worth and one based on income.70 Under the 
net worth test, an accredited investor is one “whose net worth at the time 
of purchase is $1,000,000. Net worth may be either the individual worth of 
the investor or the joint net worth of the investor and the investor’s 
spouse.”71 Under the income-based definition, an accredited investor is 
one “who has an income in excess of $200,000 in each of the last two 
years and who reasonably expects an income in excess of $200,000 in the 
current year.”72 In calculating the number of purchasers in an offering the 
Commission exempts accredited investors,73 such that an issuer may offer 
 
 
Id. 
 66. Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2007). The relevant portions of Rule 505 read: 
To qualify for exemption under the section, offers and sales must satisfy the terms and 
conditions of [Rule 501] and [Rule 502]. . . . The aggregate offering price for an offering of 
securities under this [Rule 505] . . . shall not exceed $5,000,000, less the aggregate offering 
price for all securities sold within the twelve months before the start of and during the 
offering of securities under this section . . . . There are no more than or the issuer reasonably 
believes that there are no more than 35 purchasers of securities from the issuer in any offering 
under this section. 
Id. 
 67. Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007). The relevant portions of Rule 506 read: 
To qualify for an exemption under this section, offers and sales must satisfy all the terms and 
conditions of [Rule 501] and [Rule 502]. . . . There are no more than or the issuer reasonably 
believes that there are no more than 35 purchasers of securities from the issuer in any offering 
under this section. . . . Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with 
his purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business 
matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or 
the issuer reasonably believes immediately prior to making any sale that such purchaser 
comes within this description. 
Id. For information regarding the thirty-five unaccredited purchaser limit under Rules 505 and 506, see 
supra note 57. 
 68. Rules 501 through 503 set forth the definitions, terms, and conditions which are applicable to 
Regulation D. Release No. 33-6389, 24 SEC Docket 1166, 1167. Rule 502 sets forth the general 
conditions which must be met for offerings under Rules 504 through 506. Rule 502, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.502 (2007). Rule 503 sets forth the filing requirements for notice of sale forms (form D), which 
require an indication of the exemption being claimed. Rule 503, 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (2007).  
 69. Release No. 33-6389, 24 SEC Docket 1166, 1169.  
 70. Id. at 1172. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See Rule 501(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(e) (2007). 
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its interests to thirty-five purchasers and an unlimited number of 
accredited investors.74 Commentators noted that the adoption of 
Regulation D “brought certainty” to the private offering, because issuers 
could now confidently determine whether an investor was accredited and 
whether an offering was exempted based on objective criteria.75  
In 1988, the Commission expanded the accredited investor income-
based definition to include spousal joint income.76 Under the expanded 
definition, an accredited investor was one “who had an individual income 
in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income 
with that person’s spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years and 
has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the 
current year.”77 The following year, the Commission enacted Rule 508, 
which created a safe harbor for issuers from civil liability for unintentional 
and insignificant violations of Regulation D made in good faith.78 Rule 
508 dramatically reduced the risk involved in “making gambles about the 
subjective sophistication of investors.”79 
Since the addition of the spousal joint income test and the issuer’s safe 
harbor under Rule 508, little has changed substantively to the accredited 
investor definition under Regulation D.80 Currently, a natural person who 
is an accredited investor is one  
whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s 
spouse, at the time of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000 . . . [or] who 
had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two 
most recent years or joint income with that person’s spouse in 
 
 
 74. See Mercer Bullard, Regulating Hedge Fund Managers: The Investment Company Act as a 
Regulatory Screen, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 286, 331 (2008).  
 75. See Paredes, supra note 23, at 997 n.91; see also Sargent, supra note 45, at 239 (noting that 
the enactment of Regulation D “represented an attempt to make the exemptive system more 
workable”). 
 76. Securities Act Release No. 33-6758, 40 SEC Docket 449, 450 (Mar. 3, 1988). 
 77. Id. at 453. 
 78. Securities Act Release No. 33-6825, 43 SEC Docket 704, 705–06 (Mar. 14, 1989). Rule 508 
provides a safe harbor for those issuers who fail to comply with a requirement of Regulation D, so 
long as “the requirement is not designed to protect specifically the complaining person; the failure to 
comply is insignificant to the offering as a whole; and there has been a good faith and reasonable 
attempt to comply with all requirements of the regulation.” Id. at 704; see also Rule 508, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.508 (2007). 
 79. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 301. 
 80. Securities Act Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007). In 2001, the 
SEC proposed defining the term “qualified purchaser” under the 1933 Act to mean “accredited 
investor” as it is defined in Rule 501. Securities Act Release No. 33-8041, 76 SEC Docket 1035, 1035 
(Dec. 19, 2001). 
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excess of $300,000 in each of those years and has a reasonable 
expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year.81 
B. A Need for Change 
1. The Evolving Financial Landscape 
The tremendous growth of hedge funds necessitates the revision of the 
accredited investor definition. Hedge fund investment is growing, due, in 
part, to its fashionable reputation.82 Increased participation of institutional 
investors in the hedge fund industry has also contributed to the area’s 
growth.83 As hedge fund investment grows, it plays an increasingly 
significant role in the securities markets.84 In light of this growth and 
impact on the securities market, the Commission is concerned that there 
are currently not enough protections in place for hedge fund investors.85  
The first hedge fund was created by Alfred Winslow Jones in 1949 as a 
private partnership.86 Jones’ private partnership was labeled a “hedge 
fund” because of its “hedging” investment strategy, which involved 
investing “in equities and us[ing] leverage and short selling to ‘hedge’ the 
portfolio’s exposure to movements of the corporate equity markets.”87 
Under such a hedging strategy, the goal is to generate returns regardless of 
market movement.88 Early hedge funds also employed arbitrage89 as an 
 
 
 81. Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2007). 
 82. Susan Chandler, Leader Wants Morningstar to Rise Higher in Firmament: Profile 
Morningstar CEO Joe Mansueto, SEATTLE TIMES, July 30, 2006, at F1 (noting that “hedge funds have 
become the trendy place to invest for institutions and high-net-worth individuals.”); see also Justin 
Lahart, Ahead of the Tape: Hedged In, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2004, at C1 (noting that nine “years ago, 
members of the country-club set were bragging about the hot stock they had bought. Nowadays, it is 
all about having money with a hot manager. The sexy thing to say is, ‘Yeah, I’m in a hedge fund’”) 
(internal quotations omitted); see supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Press Release, Russell Investment Group, Investing Alternatives to Surge Worldwide, 2 
(Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.russell.com/no/Media_Centre/Press_Releases/Current_ 
Releases/Alternative%20Survey%20Release_UK.pdf; see also Thierry Olivier Desmet, Understanding 
Hedge Fund Advisor Regulation, 4 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 9 (2008) (noting that the Virginia 
Retirement System has $1.6 billion invested in hedge funds, and the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System has $2 billion invested in hedge funds).  
 84. See infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
 85. See infra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. 
 86. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at 3.  
 87. Id. “Hedging” is an investment strategy, which takes “long and short positions in debt and 
equity securities as a means of offsetting some of the investment risks associated with market 
uncertainties.” Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681, 684 
(2000).  
 88. See Desmet, supra note 83, at 3. The goal of hedging is in contrast with the investment goal 
inherent in buying stock, which is “the more limited goal of outperforming other investors or market 
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investment strategy. Today, hedge funds are not merely involved in 
hedging or arbitrage.90 Rather, hedge funds engage in a diverse range of 
investment strategies, such as trading equities, fixed income securities, 
convertible securities, currencies, exchange-traded futures, over-the-
counter derivatives, future contracts, commodity options and other non-
securities investments.91  
Generally, hedge funds hold a pool of securities or assets that are not 
registered under any of the securities laws.92 Hedge funds may use the 
Regulation D private offering exemptions to avoid registration 
requirements by only issuing their interests to accredited investors.93 
Under Regulation D’s Rule 506, issuers may offer interests to as many as 
thirty-five unaccredited investors, so long as those purchasers are 
sophisticated.94 But in practice, hedge funds rarely issue securities to 
unaccredited investors, because doing so is not cost efficient.95  
Hedge funds typically employ a fee structure which compensates the 
hedge fund advisors based on the fund’s capital gains and capital 
appreciation.96 Fund advisors generally receive an annual management fee 
of 1–2% of assets under management plus a 20% share of the fund’s 
annual appreciation.97 Capital raised by hedge funds generally includes 
significant investments by the fund’s own advisory personnel.98 
 
 
indices.” Id. 
 89. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at 3–4. Similar to hedging, arbitrage is an investment 
strategy employed by hedge funds. Arbitrage involves buying and selling the same security in different 
markets to exploit and profit from the security’s pricing differences. Matthew Goldstein, A Secret 
Society: Hedge Funds and Their Mysterious Success, 6 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 111, 116 (2007). 
 90. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at 3–4.  
 91. Id. at 3.  
 92. Id. at viii. 
 93. Id. at x. In addition to the private offering exemption under Regulation D, hedge funds may 
also rely on the sophisticated investor exclusion under the Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. 
No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2000)). Id. Under this exclusion, 
the private investment vehicle may only sell interests to “qualified purchasers.” A qualified purchaser, 
who is a natural investor, is one who owns “not less than $ 5,000,000 in investments.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-2(a)(51).  
 94. Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2007); Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007).  
 95. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at x; see also Preiserowicz, supra note 57, at 815–16. 
For a summary of the disclosure requirements for hedge funds issuing securities to unaccredited 
investors, see infra note 111.  
 96. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at viii.  
 97. Id. at ix. This fee structure is often know as the “Two and Twenty,” as receipt of 2% of the 
assets under management plus 20% of the fund’s profits is generally the most common management 
fee arrangement. See Jennifer Ralph Oppold, The Changing Landscape of Hedge Fund Regulation: 
Current Concerns and a Principle-Based Approach, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 833, 838 (2008).  
 98. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at viii.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
746 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:733 
 
 
 
 
Today, hedge funds continue to grow at a rate significantly higher than 
other financial sectors.99 Hedge funds play an important role in securities 
markets as repeat traders of securities, which increases market 
efficiency100 and enhances liquidity.101 Hedge funds also impact the 
securities market through their extensive use of leverage.102 The continued 
growth of hedge funds is of interest due to the potential impact it may 
have on the character of financial markets.103  
Dramatic hedge fund growth has led to concerns about current levels of 
protection for hedge fund investors.104 The popularity, growth, and 
prevalence of hedge funds means that more and more people are investing 
in them, and as this population of investors grows larger, it is more likely 
to include hapless individuals who do not have the sophistication 
necessary to fend for themselves.105 Further, commentators have noted that 
as the hedge fund industry continues to grow, there is greater potential for 
hedge funds to fail as a result of excessive use of leverage combined with 
 
 
 99. Id. at 1. The Commission noted that hedge fund assets grew 1084% from 1993 to 2003, while 
mutual fund assets grew 289% during the same period. Id. at 1 n.4. See also supra notes 25–26 
(detailing additional measures of recent hedge fund growth).  
 100. See Private-Sector Refinancing of the Large Hedge Fund, Long-Term Capital Management: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. 151 (1998) (statement 
of Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/TESTIMONY/1998/19981001.htm.  
[Hedge funds] contribute to market efficiency in two ways: First, the identification of 
arbitrage opportunities requires extensive research. By executing trading strategies based on 
their market research, hedge funds improve the informational efficiency of markets by 
embedding that information into market prices. Second, whether hedge fund trades reflect an 
arbitrage strategy or speculation, their active presence in the market improves liquidity. Given 
that hedge funds often bet against the direction of the market, they provide ready 
counterparties in trades and thus help to complete the market.  
WILLIAM P. OSTERBERG & JAMES B. THOMSON, THE TRUTH ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS 4 (1999), 
available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Commentary/1999/0501.pdf. See also Oppold, 
supra note 97, at 840 (noting that “[i]n 2006, one estimate claimed that hedge funds accounted for up 
to 50% of daily trading volume in some asset classes.”). 
 101. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at 4. Liquidity is an economics term which “refers to the 
willingness of participants to enter the market and buy or sell. The more buyers and sellers willing to 
enter the market, the more liquid it is.” GORDON DE BROUWER, HEDGE FUNDS IN EMERGING 
MARKETS 22 (2002). See also OSTERBERG & THOMSON, supra note 100, at 3 (regarding the impact of 
hedge fund trading on market liquidity).  
 102. See Oppold, supra note 97, at 839. Oppold notes that a $5 billion hedge fund with a debt-to-
equity ratio of 25:1 has an estimated $125 billion impact on the capital markets. Id.  
 103. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at 2.  
 104. Securities Act Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007); Securities Act 
Release No. 33-8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 45116, 45126 (proposed Aug. 10, 2007).  
 105. See Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Fund and Investor Protection Regulation, ECON. REV., 
Fourth Quarter, 2006, at 35, 43 (noting that “more unsophisticated investors are able to participate in 
hedge fund investments than in prior years and that this participation may have contributed to the 
growing fraud problem that the SEC has observed.”).  
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high concentrations of capital, conflicts of interest, or fraud.106 These 
concerns are part of what has motivated the Commission to consider 
increasing its regulatory requirements for private offering purchasers via 
revisions to the accredited investor definition.107  
2. Criticisms of the Accredited Investor Definition 
In establishing Regulation D, the SEC’s goal was to provide a clear and 
objective standard to determine whether a purchaser has “sufficient 
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters to enable that 
purchaser to evaluate the merits and risks of a prospective investment, or 
to hire someone who can.”108 In striving to achieve this goal, the 
Commission has relied upon wealth as a proxy for a determination that an 
investor is capable of fending for him or herself.109 Regulation D was 
initially welcomed when it was adopted in 1982, but as issuers and 
purchasers gained more experience in dealing with the regulation, 
criticism mounted,110 especially towards the Commission’s wealth-based 
proxy.111 
 
 
 106. See Desmet, supra note 83, at 10–13.  
 107. Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400; Release No. 33-8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 45126. As of 
2004, “the Commission [had] brought 46 enforcement cases asserting that hedge fund investors [had] 
been defrauded of an estimated $1 billion by their advisers.” Cynthia M. Fornelli, SEC Deputy Dir., 
Remarks Before the Hedge Fund Best Practices Seminar: Succeeding in the New Regulatory 
Environment (Sept. 14, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch091404cmf.htm. 
 108. Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 405. For background information on the history of 
Regulation D, see supra notes 27–81. 
 109. See Paredes, supra note 23, at 997; see also Fletcher, supra note 23, at 1124 (noting that the 
Commission has prioritized wealth over sophistication as the essential measure of accredited investor 
status). 
 110. See Sargent, supra note 45, at 240–41. 
 111. Legal scholars have been critical of the Commission’s wealth-based accredited investor 
standard. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 23; Choi, supra note 23; Fletcher, supra note 23; Friedman, 
supra note 23; Warren, supra note 23. Commentators and investors also have been critical. See, e.g., 
Comment Letter from David Patch (Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/ 
s72506-613.pdf (the accredited investor minimum net income requirements restrict “sophisticated 
individuals from investing in a hedge fund and yet a wealthy yet uneducated individual can be 
accepted”); Comment Letter from Bruce A. Broussely (Apr. 10, 2007), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/s72506-612.htm (“By having ANY minimum net worth requirement, you 
have in effect told millions of college-educated people with degrees in finance (including myself), 
engineers, CPAs and other professionals that they are not smart enough to invest, which is the height 
of elitism.”); see also Nathan J. Greene, The SEC’s Latest Hedge Fund Rulemaking: More than 600 
Comment Letters Later, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP., July 2007, at 1, 4. Legal scholars and 
commentators have been critical of other aspects of Regulation D, such as Rule 502’s disclosure 
requirements, and the Form D notice requirements. See Sargent, supra note 45, at 240–41. Under Rule 
502(b), when an issuer sells a security to an unaccredited investor, the issuer must furnish financial 
statement information prior to the sale of securities. Rule 502, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2007). For a 
summary of Rule 502’s disclosure requirements, see Terrence A. Everett, Private Placements Under 
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Several flaws exist with a wealth-based proxy for sophistication and 
invulnerability. First, net worth may not, in fact, be an indication of an 
investor’s sophistication or of an investor’s ability to bear the risk of 
loss.112 For example, it is possible that an investor who is accredited on the 
basis of income “may actually be insolvent at the time of purchase.”113 
Also, just because an investor is accredited does not guarantee that he or 
she will be capable of avoiding opportunistic brokers or get-rich-quick 
schemes.114  
Second, the accredited investor definition is “both under- and 
overinclusive” in scope.115 It is underinclusive because otherwise 
financially knowledgeable investors may be deemed unaccredited because 
they do not meet the minimum wealth requirements.116 Conversely, the 
accredited investor definition is overinclusive because a financial novice 
may be deemed accredited, as long as he or she meets the standard’s 
requirements based upon the accident of being rich.117 Indeed, the 
Commission itself has recognized that the current accredited investor 
definition may be overinclusive.118 The SEC noted that due to inflation 
and sustained growth in wealth, many more individuals now meet the 
wealth and income thresholds than when the standards were initially set.119 
Such inflation and sustained growth in wealth results in more accredited 
investors, many of whom may not be able to appreciate the risks of 
investing in private offerings.120 
Third, the motivation for enacting the accredited investor definition in 
Regulation D—to clarify the private offering exemptions and the risk of 
liability for noncompliance121—is no longer relevant due to the enactment 
 
 
United States Federal Securities Law, 9 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 157, 165–67 (2001). Under Rule 503, an issuer 
offering or selling securities under the private offering exemption must file five copies of Form D with 
the Commission. Rule 503, 17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (2007). Form D requires basic issuer identification 
data and information about the offering, the offering price, the number of investors, expenses, and use 
of proceeds. Form D is available through the Commission’s website at http://www.sec.gov/about/ 
forms/formd.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2008).  
 112. See Warren, supra note 23, at 382.  
 113. Id. 
 114. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 
1, 19 (2003).  
 115. Choi, supra note 23, at 310. 
 116. Id. at 311.  
 117. Id. 
 118. Securities Act Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 404 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. The Commission noted that accredited investors may not be able to appreciate the risks 
specific to private offerings, such as “undisclosed conflicts of interest, complex fee structures and the 
higher risk that may accompany such pools’ anticipated returns.” Id.  
 121. Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 24 SEC Docket 1166, 1166 (Mar. 8, 1982).  
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of Rule 508.122 Rule 508 creates a safe harbor, stating that “failure to 
comply with [Rules 504, 505, or 506] will not result in the loss of 
exemption [privileges, so long as] . . . [t]he failure to comply did not 
pertain to a term, condition or requirement directly intended to protect that 
particular individual or entity[,] . . . that was insignificant with respect to 
the offering as a whole[,]” and was in good faith.123 With the enactment of 
Rule 508, issuers no longer need to worry about inadvertently issuing 
securities to an unaccredited investor and losing their private offering 
exemptions.124 As such, the enactment of Rule 508 minimizes the need for 
an objective wealth-based accredited investor standard, because it removes 
the risk associated with making subjective determinations of 
accreditation.125  
C. Alternative Proposals 
1. Investor Classification 
Legal scholars have recognized the flaws in the current accredited 
investor definition and have proposed possible alternatives. Scholars 
advocating a move away from the current wealth-based accredited investor 
definition typically emphasize the importance of investors’ knowledge of 
the financial marketplace.126 But, scholars disagree about whether investor 
knowledge alone is a sufficient indicator of sophistication.127 For instance, 
within Stephen Choi’s information-based classification system, investor 
knowledge and accessibility to informational resources are determinative 
of an investor’s classification group and the corresponding transactions 
available to that group.128 Choi suggests classifying investors into four 
groups based upon their relative knowledge and resources: (1) issuer-level 
investors,129 (2) intermediary-level investors,130 (3) aggregate-level 
 
 
 122. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 301.  
 123. Rule 508, 17 C.F.R. 230.508 (2007). 
 124. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 301.  
 125. See id. 
 126. See Choi, supra note 23; Fletcher, supra note 23. Choi’s information-based classification 
scheme deals with investors generally, rather than those investors involved in private offerings, but is 
still applicable as an investor classification scheme for those investors involved in private offerings. 
See Choi, supra note 23, at 280. 
 127. See Choi, supra note 23; see Fletcher, supra note 23.  
 128. See Choi, supra note 23, at 285–301. 
 129. Choi’s first classification group, “issuer-level investors,” are those investors “who are 
informed about issuer-specific risks and the various types of investor protections that issuers may 
adopt.” Id. at 285. Within Choi’s classification scheme, the transactions which issuer level investors 
may engage in are not limited in any fashion. Id.  
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investors,131 and (4) unsophisticated investors.132  
In contrast, C. Edward Fletcher III’s investor classification scheme 
eschews a knowledge-determinative classification system like Choi’s in 
favor of a broader multi-factored sophistication inquiry.133 Fletcher’s 
determination of investor sophistication proceeds by examining three 
categories of investor-specific information: (1) an investor’s financial and 
business acumen, (2) individual characteristics of sophistication, and (3) 
investment-specific behavior.134 For Fletcher, knowledge is merely one of 
several relevant factors in the sophistication inquiry.135 
If the SEC were to consider Choi’s and Fletcher’s alternative investor 
classification schemes, it would likely find Fletcher’s multi-factored 
approach more attractive than Choi’s knowledge-determinative approach. 
Fletcher’s proposed factors are culled from existing judicial opinions 
distinguishing between sophisticated and unsophisticated investors.136 In 
 
 
 130. Intermediary-level investors are investors who do not have issuer-level information, nor do 
they have “a direct market incentive to adopt value-maximizing investor protections.” Id. at 290. Choi 
posits that intermediary-level investors should be required to “associate with a securities market 
intermediary for all of their transactions.” Id. at 291.  
 131. Aggregate-level investors are those investors who have “the capacity to track highly visible 
organizations” (HVOs), but do not have the resources or incentives to research issuers or 
intermediaries, and as such, find it cost-effective “to inform themselves on the reputation and provided 
investor protections of certain [HVOs].” Id. at 296. Under Choi’s classification scheme, aggregate-
level investors will be required to associate themselves with “an HVO or an HVO-sanctioned market 
participant for all of their securities transactions.” Id. at 298.  
 132. Unsophisticated investors are those investors who “lack either the rationality or the capacity 
to investigate and accurately value protections provided at even the aggregate level.” Id. at 300. 
Unsophisticated investors would only be able to deal with HVOs or HVO-sanctioned market 
participants, and regarding only passive-index mutual funds. Id. at 300–01. 
 133. See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 1149–53.  
 134. Id. Within these three categories are several subcategories. Under financial and business 
acumen, which Fletcher deems “the most important single criterion of investor sophistication,” are 
“investment experience,” “professional status,” “history of speculative investments,” “government or 
business experience,” “professional experience in the securities industry,” and “general familiarity 
with securities transactions.” Id. at 1149–50. Under individual characteristics of sophistication are 
“understanding trading in an investment account,” “education,” “special access to information,” 
“intelligence,” “age,” and “wealth and income.” Id. at 1150–52. Under investment-specific behavior 
are “regular consultation with investment professionals,” “number of brokerage accounts,” “stock club 
membership,” “amount of money invested,” “scrutiny over investment accounts,” “attending investing 
conferences,” “subscribing to financial or investment journals,” and “viewing financial television 
programming.” Id. at 1152–53.  
 135. Id. at 1149–53.  
 136. For example, Fletcher bases his use of “professional status” as a subcategory of “financial 
and business acumen” upon the following judicial decisions: Stern v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 603 F.2d 1073, 1093–96 (4th Cir. 1979); Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson 
Trawlers, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 1378, 1385 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff’d, 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988); Xaphes 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 471, 481–82 (D. Me. 1986); Smith v. 
Sade & Co., No. 81-2628, 1982 WL 1341 (D.D.C. Oct. 27, 1982); Scarfarotti v. Bache & Co., Inc., 
438 F. Supp. 199, 204 (D.C.N.Y. 1977). See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 1149 n.389. 
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contrast, Choi’s approach is a postulate influenced by the current 
restrictive nature of the federal securities regime, rather than a study of 
existing judicial opinions.137 Moreover, one of Fletcher’s factors (“amount 
of money invested”) was incorporated into the Commission’s proposed 
revisions to the accredited investor definition, further evidencing 
likelihood that the Commission would favor his scheme.138  
2. Licensing/Regulatory Regimes 
The current federal securities regulatory regime was enacted to protect 
investors by providing disclosure and protecting against fraud.139 This is 
achieved through the regulation of issuers, intermediaries and self-
regulatory organizations.140 However, legal scholars advocating a change 
to the current accredited investor definition also stress the importance of 
refocusing the current regulatory regime.141 For example, Stephen Choi 
posits that the emphasis of federal securities regulation should be on 
regulating investors directly.142 In keeping with Choi’s knowledge-based 
investor classification scheme,143 appropriate investor regulation would 
depend upon an individual investor’s particular knowledge base.144 Choi 
suggests that issuer-level investors, his most knowledgeable and 
sophisticated class of investors, should not be subject to mandatory 
regulation.145 Choi’s next most knowledgeable and sophisticated class of 
 
 
 137. See Choi, supra note 23, at 280–81. 
 138. Fletcher includes “amount of money invested” as one of sophistication inquiry factors, noting 
that “[s]ome investors put hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars at risk in securities 
investments; such investments show sophistication.” Fletcher, supra note 23, at 1152. The proposed 
revision to the accredited investor definition would add a requirement that natural persons not only 
meet the current accredited investor definition (have a net worth that exceeds $1,000,000, or have an 
individual income in excess of $200,000 or jointly with his or her spouse in excess of $300,000), but 
own not less than $2,500,000 in investments at the time of purchase of securities. See Rule 501(a), 17 
C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2007); Securities Act Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 405 (proposed Jan. 
4, 2007). The Commission notes that this is to ensure that investors are “capable of evaluating and 
bearing the risks of their investments.” Id. at 400. 
 139. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 
77bbbb (2000)).  
 140. See Choi, supra note 23, at 280. 
 141. Id.; Friedman, supra note 23. 
 142. See Choi, supra note 23, at 280.  
 143. See supra notes 129–32.  
 144. See Choi, supra note 23, at 280.  
 145. Within Choi’s investor regulation system, when issuers transact with issuer-level investors, 
issuers would “internalize both the cost and benefit of investor protections.” Id. at 285. In addition, 
issuers transacting with issuer-level investors would not be subject to mandatory regulation, mandatory 
information disclosure or antifraud liability. Id. Correspondingly, issuer-level investors selling their 
interests to other issuer-level investors would not be subject to mandatory regulation. Id. Under such a 
self-tailored regulatory system, issuers transacting with issuer-level investors would be able to 
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investor, intermediary-level investors, would also avoid mandatory 
regulation, so long as they associated themselves with appropriate 
intermediaries.146 Choi’s aggregate-level investors would, however, be 
subject to mandatory regulation. Aggregate-level investors would be 
required to associate themselves with highly visible organizations 
(“HVOs”) or HVO-sanctioned market participants.147 Finally, Choi’s least 
knowledgeable and least sophisticated class of investors, unsophisticated 
investors, would be required to associate themselves with HVOs or HVO-
sanctioned market participants, similar to aggregate level investors, but 
with the additional restriction that they transact only in passive-index 
mutual funds.148  
To implement his system of investor classification and investor self-
regulation, Choi proposes a licensing system, wherein investors would 
have to obtain a license prior to engaging in any securities transactions.149 
Choi considers three options: a mandatory licensing system, a voluntary 
licensing system, or a hybrid system incorporating aspects of both the 
mandatory and voluntary systems.150 Under Choi’s mandatory licensing 
scheme, investors’ acumen would be tested according to their knowledge 
 
 
determine the standard of liability that they would face, e.g., strict liability or criminal liability. Id. at 
286–87. Additionally, within this self-tailored regulatory scheme, issuers may also “select the level of 
enforcement they will face.” Id. at 287. Self-tailored regulation would govern both primary and 
secondary market transactions. Id. 
 146. With intermediary-level investors, there is still not a need for mandatory regulation; rather, 
“so long as issuers deal with investors associated with appropriate intermediaries, the intermediaries 
will act for the investors in screening investments and in negotiating with issuers for value-maximizing 
protections.” Id. at 290. For this classification of investor, Choi posits that intermediary-level investors 
should be required to “associate with a securities market intermediary for all of their transactions.” Id. 
at 291. Choi proposes circumventing prohibitive costs associated with applying investor protections, as 
well as problems associated with intermediaries cheating on a high reputation, with self-tailored 
regulation aimed at intermediaries. Id. at 293. Much like the self-tailored regulatory scheme for 
issuers, here, intermediaries “could bind themselves to particular screening procedures, conflict of 
interest prohibitions, minimum capitalization requirements, and other devices at a lower cost than 
through contract or reputation.” Id. This may reduce the investor-related costs of researching the 
reputation of specific intermediaries. Id. at 294.  
 147. Under Choi’s classification scheme, aggregate-level investors will be required to associate 
themselves with “an HVO or an HVO-sanctioned market participant for all of their securities 
transactions.” Id. at 298. Much like issuers and intermediaries, HVOs would also take part in self-
tailored regulation. Id. at 300. This would allow HVOs “to design value-maximizing investor 
protections across all levels of market participants.” Id.  
 148. Under Choi’s classification scheme, unsophisticated investors are those investors who “lack 
either the rationality or the capacity to investigate and accurately value protections provided at even 
the aggregate level.” Id. Unsophisticated investors would only be able to deal with HVOs or HVO-
sanctioned market participants, and regarding only passive-index mutual funds. Id. at 300–01. 
 149. Id. at 310–19.  
 150. Id.  
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of market participants, market risks, and available investor protections.151 
As an alternative to mandatory licensing, Choi also proposes a voluntary 
licensing scheme whereby investors can “self-select into appropriate 
regulatory categories.”152 As a final alternative, Choi proposes a hybrid of 
his mandatory and voluntary licensing schemes, which would include a 
voluntary licensing regime with certain mandatory aspects.153  
In contrast to Choi, who advocates abolishing the current securities 
regulatory regime,154 Howard M. Friedman asserts that the Commission 
should supplement the current regulatory framework with an increased 
emphasis on broker-dealer regulation.155 For Friedman, the current 
regulatory framework does not accord enough weight to portfolio 
diversification.156 He suggests that appropriate broker-dealer regulation 
can be achieved by following the New Jersey Superior Court’s test in 
Ehrlich v. First National Bank of Princeton.157 The Ehrlich court held that 
when a professional is engaged not just as a broker to execute stock 
transactions, but as an investment advisor, prudent advice includes “(1) 
knowing the customer, his assets and objectives; (2) diversifying 
investments; (3) engaging in objective analysis as the basis for purchase 
 
 
 151. Id. at 311.  
 152. Id. at 313. Under Choi’s voluntary licensing scheme, “investors who understand their own 
information capacity,” will be able to determine their appropriate regulatory category. Id. To illustrate 
this, Choi provides the following example: 
[C]onsider Andrew, an unsophisticated investor. Under a voluntary licensing scheme, if 
Andrew opts into the category of issuer-level investors, he will purchase securities of issuers 
that focus their efforts and investor protections on issuer-level investors. Consequently, no 
investor protection will exist to protect the unsophisticated in the issuer-level market 
segment; issuer-level investors will refuse to pay for these protections. Andrew will therefore 
be at a greater risk of fraud among other risks and will systematically do worse than more 
sophisticated investors in the market. To the extent Andrew is rational and understands his 
own capabilities, he will therefore choose not to license himself as an issuer-level investor. 
Id. at 314.  
 153. Id. at 318–19. For Choi, there is no specific combination of the mandatory and voluntary 
licensing schemes that will produce the perfect blend of the two. One possibility is a voluntary 
licensing regime with certain mandatory aspects such as a mandatory “waiting period for investors to 
move from aggregate-level to intermediary-level and eventually to issuer-level. . . . Alternatively, 
regulators could employ a mandatory licensing regime that gives investors some confined ability to 
select their proper license level.” Id.  
 154. Id. at 283 (advocating that regulators abolish “most of the Securities Act and the Exchange 
Act, as well as much of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940”). 
 155. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 301.  
 156. To achieve more meaningful protection for individual accredited investors in private 
offerings, Friedman posits that there must be assurance in the securities regulatory framework that 
“securities will be sold at appropriate prices and will be placed only in diversified portfolios, or only in 
the undiversified portfolios of those who clearly understand the ramifications of nondiversification.” 
Id.  
 157. Ehrich v. First Nat’l Bank of Princeton, 505 A.2d 220 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1984).  
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and sale recommendations and (4) making the account productive.”158 
Friedman maintains that the Ehrlich court’s holding should prompt the 
Commission to require that broker-dealers “analyze the suitability of 
adding the particular security to the [investor’s] portfolio” and only permit 
sales “to those . . . investors for whom the security is suitable in light of 
the investor’s entire portfolio.”159  
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Current Accredited Investor Definition Must be Changed 
The current accredited investor definition is faulty and incomplete; 
income and net worth alone are not the best measures of financial 
sophistication. The Commission created the accredited investor definition 
in hopes of creating an objective measure to determine whether an investor 
was eligible to participate in a private offering.160 But, as scholars have 
noted, this bright-line standard is both under- and overinclusive.161 That 
the definition is underinclusive is demonstrated by the introductory 
hypothetical case of a recent business school graduate: saddled with 
enormous student loan debt, she would likely not meet the minimum 
accredited investment wealth requirements, even though she would be 
financially sophisticated and able to capably assess the merits of an 
investment in a private offering. Conversely, the overinclusive nature of 
the definition would be exemplified by a high school drop-out, with no 
business or investment knowledge who recently won the state lottery’s 
$50 million dollar jackpot. She would be deemed an accredited investor, 
but likely would not be financially sophisticated.  
Regulation D was enacted to “simplify and clarify [the] existing 
exemptions,”162 which had proven problematic, especially for small 
offerors who were unable to determine when the exemptions applied.163 
 
 
 158. Id. at 235. The court acknowledged that this duty is a continuing one. Id. at 235–36.  
 159. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 316–17. States should also consider imposing an obligation 
on dealers licensed in their state to make annual reviews of the suitability of their clients’ portfolios. 
Id. 
 160. Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, 4 SEC Docket 154, 154–55 (Apr. 23, 1974); Securities 
Act Release No. 33-6180, 19 SEC Docket 295, 297 (Jan. 17, 1980); see Paredes, supra note 23, at 997 
n.91; see also Sargent, supra note 45, at 239 (noting that the enactment of Regulation D “represented 
an attempt to make the exemptive system more workable”). 
 161. Choi, supra note 23, at 310. 
 162. Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 24 SEC Docket 1166, 1166 (Mar. 8, 1982). 
 163. Securities Act Release No. 33-6121, 18 SEC Docket 287, 288 (Sept. 11, 1979); see also 
Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 38, at 635 (foreseeing some of the potential problems for issuers, 
especially small issuers, under Rule 146). 
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Issuers risked losing their exemptions if they mistakenly determined that 
an investor was accredited.164 As scholars have noted, this rationale for 
employing an objective test is no longer relevant due to the enactment of 
Rule 508, the seller’s safe harbor.165 An issuer may not lose his exemption 
for mistakenly making an issuance to an unaccredited investor so long as 
that mistake was “insignificant with respect to the offering as a whole” 
and in good faith.166 Therefore, the one-time imperative for an objective 
bright-line standard, such as net worth or income to determine accredited 
investor status, no longer exists. The absence of this animating cause, 
along with the inherent imperfections in the definition’s scope, 
demonstrates that the SEC’s accredited investor definition is ripe for 
reconsideration.  
1. Shortcomings of Existing Alternative Proposals 
a. Shortcomings of Alternative Investor Classification Schemes 
While the current accredited investor definition is faulty and 
incomplete, the scholarly alternatives that have been advanced are also 
imperfect. For example, one of Choi’s motivations for proposing an 
alternative classification scheme is that the current federal securities 
regulations are too restrictive, but Choi’s classification system may still 
subject investors to unwarranted and unwanted restrictions.167 Under 
Choi’s proposal, unsophisticated investors are barred from transacting in 
anything other than passive-index mutual funds.168 While this would 
afford protection to many vulnerable participants, it may be undesirable 
because it could cause unsophisticated investors to do “systematically 
worse than other investors.”169 
 
 
 164. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 301.  
 165. Rule 508, 17 C.F.R. § 230.508 (2007).  
 166. Id. 
 167. See Choi, supra note 23, at 280–81. Choi cites the 1933 Act’s private offering exemption and 
accredited investor requirement to describe the restrictive nature of the current federal securities 
regime:  
[T]he Securities Act of 1933 . . . forces issuers conducting a public offering to refrain from 
making offers of securities until they file a registration statement with the SEC and to delay 
sales until the registration statement becomes effective. As a result, investors are unable to 
purchase securities of companies choosing not to engage in a public offering unless the 
investors qualify to participate in a far more restrictive private placement of securities. 
Id. at 281. 
 168. Id. at 301.  
 169. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
756 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86:733 
 
 
 
 
In addition, the informational resources needed to support such a 
scheme may not be trustworthy.170 For example, Choi’s intermediary-level 
investors must associate themselves with appropriate intermediaries, but 
these investors are forced to assume the risk that these intermediaries will 
be unfaithful or negligent in their screening duties or make unwise 
decisions.171  
Alternatively, Fletcher’s sophistication inquiry is troubling to the 
extent that some of his factors are thinly veiled references to wealth-based 
proxies; if adopted by the Commission, these factors may serve to further 
cement the current accredited investor standard that these legal scholars 
criticize.172 For example, Fletcher posits that professional status is 
indicative of sophistication.173 But Fletcher acknowledges that 
“professional status alone does not reveal very much; rather, it signals an 
investor’s education and income level.”174 Thus, while Fletcher urges a 
move away from the current accredited investor definition, his 
sophistication inquiry criteria actually seem to closely track the status quo. 
Additionally, some of Fletcher’s factors are problematic because it may 
not be reasonable or realistic for the Commission or issuers to measure or 
gauge these factors. Fletcher contends that “scrutiny over investment 
accounts,” “subscribing to financial or investment journals,” “viewing 
financial television programming,” and “reviewing confirmation slips or 
monthly statements” should all be included as subcategories of 
investment-specific behavior.175 While these behaviors would tend to 
indicate investor sophistication, there is not a reasonable way for the 
Commission or issuers to measure such behavior beyond a purchaser 
honor system, which would be vulnerable to fraud.  
 
 
 170. Id. at 290.  
 171. Id. at 295–96.  
 172. See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 1149–53. Additionally, Fletcher includes wealth and income 
as a subcategory of individual characteristics of sophistication, recognizing that “courts have suggested 
that high income levels or wealth indicate sophistication.” Id. at 1151. But for Fletcher, wealth and 
income are not necessarily determinative of sophistication alone. In fact, Fletcher recognizes that 
“[a]lthough courts should consider an investor’s ability to bear economic risk, they should also be 
sensitive to the fact that rich investors can do stupid things.” Id. at 1152. It is possible that this is the 
reason that no single factor within Fletcher’s sophistication inquiry is determinative of sophistication, 
but rather an investor’s classification should be determined from a “review [of] the criteria as a 
whole.” Id. at 1149.  
 173. Id. at 1149. “Doctors, lawyers, dentists, and other professionals are more sophisticated than 
nonprofessionals.” Id.  
 174. Id. at 1150 (emphasis added).  
 175. Id. at 1152–53.  
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Fletcher also provides no guidance as to how his factors should be 
implemented.176 For example, Fletcher asserts that “reviewing 
confirmation slips or monthly statements” is an indication of 
sophistication.177 But Fletcher does not explain how the Commission 
should implement this factor. Should the Commission require an investor 
to keep a log of how many confirmation slips or monthly statements he or 
she reviews? Should the Commission preference some post-trade 
confirmation slips over others? Fletcher does not answer these questions, 
or any other implementation questions, and thus leaves the Commission 
without guidance regarding how to employ his factors. 
b. Shortcomings of Alternative Regulatory Regimes and Licensing 
Schemes 
Neither regulatory alternative proposed by Choi or Friedman has been 
adopted and incorporated into the current regulatory regime by the 
Commission, nor do the alternative proposals appear to have even been 
considered by the Commission. This may be because there are inherent 
flaws in Choi’s investor self-regulation system and Friedman’s 
supplemental broker-dealer regulation. For example, within Choi’s self-
tailored regulatory regime, it is possible that such regulations may not, in 
fact, protect investors from dishonest or manipulative issuers.178 Issuers 
might abuse the self-tailored regulatory system by opting to forego 
liability in an effort to defraud investors.179 Under Choi’s self-regulatory 
regime, it is also possible that “managers of issuers may face a conflict in 
determining an issuer’s self-tailored regulation provisions.”180 
Additionally, issuers may implement protections to encourage issuer-level 
investors to pay a higher price for interests, only to remove the protections 
after the offering is completed.181 Finally, there is a concern that the self-
 
 
 176. See id. at 1149–53.  
 177. Id. at 1153.  
 178. See Choi, supra note 23, at 288–89.  
 179. Id. at 288. For example, within Choi’s system, “issuers dealing with issuer-level investors 
could opt out completely from public regulation.” Id. at 286. The flaw inherent in Choi’s self-tailored 
regulation is that issuers can opt out of public regulation, planning to defraud their investors, knowing 
that they are not subject to regulatory liability. See id. at 287–88.  
 180. Id. at 288. Choi reasons that, although “criminal liability may provide issuers a low-cost 
means of signaling credibility to the market that the company will disclose truthfully . . . because 
managers [would] face the possibility of incarceration under criminal liability, they may choose not to 
incorporate such provisions into the issuer’s self-tailored regulation.” Id.  
 181. Id. at 289. For example, “[m]anagement might implement shareholder devices such as proxy 
contest rules and takeover-friendly rules when issuing securities in order to obtain a high price for their 
shares, but then remove these protections once the offering is completed.” Id. 
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tailored regulatory scheme will “result in too many private regulators.”182 
Likewise, Friedman’s increased emphasis on broker-dealer regulation does 
not provide protection for investors who opt not to utilize broker-dealers 
or similar intermediaries.183  
Choi’s proposal to scrap the existing federal securities regulatory 
regime is far too sweeping in scope. Under Choi’s self-regulatory regime, 
regulators would abolish the existing federal securities framework.184 Such 
a drastic measure would eliminate useful regulatory rules like Rule 10b-5 
promulgated under the 1934 Act,185 which has been called the “most 
important legal protection for holders of securities against fraud, 
deception, insider trading, and corporate malfeasance.”186  
Choi’s proposed mandatory and voluntary licensing schemes are also 
flawed.187 A mandatory licensing system adds complexity and potential 
administrative burdens to the existing regulatory framework.188 Choi notes 
that to implement such a licensing test, the SEC would have to design an 
appropriate exam and exam materials.189 Additionally, there is the 
possibility of error: “[W]ell-informed investors might fail to receive a 
higher level of licensing despite their qualifications,” and “[c]onversely, 
some less-informed investors might mistakenly receive licensing at a 
higher level than their abilities warrant.”190 One final flaw in Choi’s 
voluntary licensing scheme is that investors may not be able to 
appropriately gauge their own level of investment knowledge due to 
overconfidence or loss-averse personality types.191  
IV. PROPOSAL 
The current accredited investor definition for natural persons is ripe for 
a fresh and reconsidered approach for at least four reasons. First, the 
current accredited investor definition is flawed and has been heavily 
 
 
 182. Id.  
 183. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 316.  
 184. See Choi, supra note 23, at 283. 
 185. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). Rule 10b-5 allows “private holders of securities [to] bring 
actions against those who have used fraud or misrepresentation in connection with the sale or purchase 
of a security.” Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule 
10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 542 (2003). 
 186. Bodie, supra note 185, at 542.  
 187. See Choi, supra note 23, at 310–19.  
 188. Id. at 312–13.  
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. at 313.  
 191. Id. at 316.  
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criticized by legal scholars and investors alike.192 Second, commentators 
have disagreed intensely over the Commission’s proposed revisions to the 
accredited investor definition.193 Third, tremendous growth in the hedge 
fund industry has resulted in hedge funds becoming more popular and 
influential within the securities market, with more investors now investing 
in them.194 As such, it is likely that as the pool of hedge fund investors 
grows, it would include unsophisticated individuals who cannot fend for 
themselves, and therefore, a more protective definition may be needed.195 
Fourth, the existing scholarly proposals for alternative investor 
classification schemes and regulatory regimes are flawed.196  
In light of this, I propose that the Commission adopt a licensing 
scheme which supplements the current accredited investor definition. Such 
a proposal would solve the problems of the current definition, meet the 
objectives of the federal securities regime, and avoid the flaws identified 
in the alternative scholarly proposals. In Part (A) of this proposal, I 
describe my licensing scheme, which incorporates two licensing exams: 
one for those natural persons who are accredited investors under the 
current definition, and one for those natural persons who are unaccredited 
investors under the current definition. In Part (B), I survey the 
shortcomings of the current accredited investor definition. I also detail 
how my proposal overcomes these shortcomings and effectuates the intent 
of the Commission in enacting Regulation D. In Part (C), I examine how 
my proposed licensing scheme is superior to scholarly alternatives. In Part 
(D), I confront potential criticism and drawbacks to my proposed licensing 
scheme.  
A. The Licensing Scheme 
Under my proposed licensing scheme, there would be two different 
licensing exams available: one exam for those natural persons who are 
accredited investors under the current definition, and one exam for those 
natural persons who are unaccredited investors under the current 
definition. This proposed licensing scheme attempts to synthesize a 
realistic measure of an investor’s “knowledge and experience in financial 
 
 
 192. See supra notes 108–25 and accompanying text.  
 193. See Securities Act Release No. 33-8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007); Securities 
Act Release No. 33-8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 45116 (proposed Aug. 10, 2007); see also supra notes 14–16, 
21–22.  
 194. See supra notes 25–26, 99–107 and accompanying text. 
 195. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 126–59, 167–90 and accompanying text.  
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and business matters,” which in turn gauges whether the investor is 
“capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective 
investment.”197  
1. The Unaccredited Investor Licensing Exam 
Under my proposal, the unaccredited investor licensing exam would be 
the default option available for all natural persons interested in purchasing 
interests in a private offering. There would be no net worth or income 
threshold that must be met to take the exam.  
This exam, longer and more intensive than the accredited investor 
licensing exam, would be adapted from portions of the information 
covered by the Series 82 exam under “Regulation of The Market for 
Registered and Unregistered Securities.”198 The Series 82 exam is the 
Limited Representative-Private Securities Offerings Qualification 
Examination, which is used to qualify individuals for the sale of private 
placement securities as part of a primary offering.199 My proposed exam 
would cover the following information: types of offerings (including 
primary, secondary, private placement, Rule 144A, and Regulation S), 
pricing of the issue (including market condition, industry conditions and 
issuer needs), exempted securities, and exempted transactions (including 
statutory exemptions, Regulation D, and the rules thereunder). Natural 
persons taking the unaccredited investor’s licensing exam would be 
required to get a passing score of seventy percent.200 A passing score 
would allow the Commission to confidently determine that an investor is, 
in fact, financially knowledgeable and sophisticated.  
 
 
 197. See Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2007). For additional information on Rule 506, see supra 
note 57.  
 198. See FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, PRIVATE SECURITIES OFFERINGS 
QUALIFICATION EXAMINATION (TEST SERIES 82) STUDY OUTLINE (2007), available at http://www. 
finra.org/web/ groups/corp_comm/documents/home_page/p011064.pdf.  
 199. The exam is administered by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which is 
a non-governmental agency which regulates all securities firms doing business in the United States. 
See FINRA, About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ 
CorporateInformation/index.htm. (last visited Dec. 22, 2008). FINRA prepares a study outline for each 
qualification exam it administers. It should be noted that the Commission is currently proposing 
modifications to the Series 82 study outline and exam, but these modifications do not affect the 
information covered under section 2 of the outline (entitled “Regulations of The Market for Registered 
and Unregistered Securities”). See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-57079, 92 SEC Docket 
931, 931 (Dec. 31, 2007).  
 200. Seventy percent is a passing score for the Series 82, as well as the other exams offered to 
investment management professionals. See NASD Notice to Members 02-27, Membership and 
Registration Rules (2002), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/rules_regs/documents/notice_ 
to_members/p003681.pdf.  
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If an investor fails to pass the licensing exam, the investor would be 
treated as unaccredited until he or she is able to retake the licensing exam 
at a later date and pass. Investors who are treated as unaccredited due to a 
failing exam score would likely not be able to participate in private 
offerings, as it is generally not cost effective for issuers to provide the 
required disclosure materials for unaccredited investors.201  
2. The Accredited Investor Licensing Exam 
Before a natural person first takes the accredited investor licensing 
exam, he or she would have to meet the wealth requirements currently 
incorporated into the accredited investor definition: (1) individual or joint 
net worth of $1,000,000, or (2) “individual income in excess of $200,000 
in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that person’s 
spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years with a reasonable 
expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year.”202 Only 
after accredited investor status has been demonstrated would a natural 
person be required to demonstrate sophistication through a short licensing 
exam. 
The purpose of having a less stringent test for those investors who meet 
the accreditation requirements under the current definition is that, while 
wealth is a flawed proxy for sophistication, wealth can be suggestive of 
sophistication.203 Furthermore, wealth may be indicative of an investor’s 
ability to absorb financial risk204 and therefore is one factor among many 
that should be assessed to determine financial acumen under the proposed 
licensing scheme. Finally, while an accredited investor may be subjected 
to a less stringent licensing exam, being subject to an exam is still better 
than getting a free pass based solely on net worth or income. A less 
stringent accredited investor exam may be imperfect, but in the long run, 
this system’s efficiency outweighs the risk of letting a hapless investor be 
deemed accredited based solely on income or net worth. It should also be 
noted that the very fact that an investor may have to take an exam may 
deter an unsophisticated investor from recklessly investing, thus making 
such an investor far less vulnerable than if he or she were automatically 
qualified to participate. Additionally, having an exam for current 
 
 
 201. See Preiserowicz, supra note 57, at 815. 
 202. Rule 501(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2007). 
 203. See Fletcher, supra note 23, at 1151–52.  
 204. See Position Papers Private Exemption Under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, 31 
BUS. LAW. 483, 491 (1975).  
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accredited investors is desirable, but there is a cynical reason to make the 
accredited investor exam less stringent: current accredited investors would 
be less likely to protest the proposed licensing scheme if they are not 
subject to the same standards as unaccredited investors. 
Such an exam would test knowledge of the concepts of public and 
private offerings, issuers and purchasers, and basic securities regulations. 
The exam would cover primarily the same material as the unaccredited 
investor licensing exam, but would have fewer questions and be less 
intensive. This would ensure that purchasers are financially sophisticated 
investors who are aware of the risks and merits inherent in participating in 
investing. Investors would be required to get a passing score of seventy 
percent to be licensed.205  
B. The Proposed Licensing Scheme Solves the Problems with the Current 
Accredited Investor Definition and Effectuates the Commission’s Intent  
Such a licensing scheme solves the problems and shortcomings of the 
current accredited investor definition. By implementing this proposal, the 
accredited investor concept would not suffer from under- or 
overinclusiveness.206 Under this licensing scheme, a recent business school 
graduate, heavily burdened with student loan debt, would be able to 
demonstrate her financial sophistication and be deemed an accredited 
investor even though she likely would not meet the current minimum 
accredited investment wealth requirements. Additionally, under this 
licensing scheme, a high school drop-out, with no business or investment 
knowledge, who recently won the state lottery’s $50 million dollar jackpot 
would not be able to rely on her winnings, but rather would have to 
demonstrate financial sophistication by taking the accredited investor 
licensing exam.  
This proposed licensing scheme also effectuates the Commission’s 
intent in enacting Regulation D: it would bring certainty to the private 
offering so that issuers can confidently determine whether an investor may 
participate.207 Under this proposal, once purchasers are licensed they 
would simply note their license number on their paperwork. That license 
number could be cross-referenced against a central database of purchasers 
 
 
 205. See supra note 200.  
 206. See Choi, supra note 23, at 310.  
 207. The Commission’s goal in enacting Regulation D was “to bring certainty to private offerings 
such that issuers could engage in private offerings with confidence that the planned offering would not 
run afoul of the 1933 Act’s registration requirements under § 5.” Paredes, supra note 23, at 997 n.91; 
see also supra notes 27–81. 
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permitted to participate in private offerings. The issuer would, with 
confidence, know that the purchaser was allowed to participate in the 
private offering. This is similar to how one may look up an attorney’s bar 
number to ensure that the attorney is licensed to practice law in a 
particular jurisdiction. 
In addition, this licensing scheme is also in line with the SEC’s goal of 
providing investor protection, since natural persons would not be allowed 
to participate in a private offering unless they can prove in a written exam 
that they are aware of the risks and merits inherent in investing in a private 
offering. As such, those investors who are not capable of understanding 
the risks and merits, and in turn, not able to protect themselves, would not 
be permitted to participate until they are capable of doing so. 
Finally, a licensing scheme would encourage and increase investor 
education, resulting in a more sophisticated and savvy marketplace. As 
potential investors prepare for either of the two licensing exams, they 
would become more familiar with the risks and merits of investing, 
securities regulation, and private offering exemptions under Regulation D. 
In addition, investors would be required to keep their license current 
through periodic continuing investor education courses. This would also 
serve to increase purchaser education levels and keep investors abreast of 
changes in the securities regulatory regime or the financial markets. 
C. The Proposed Licensing Scheme is Superior to the Proposed Scholarly 
Alternatives 
The proposed licensing scheme is superior to the scholarly alternatives 
advanced by Stephen Choi, C. Edward Fletcher III, and Howard M. 
Friedman. Under my proposed licensing scheme, investors would not be 
subject to unwarranted and unwanted restrictions, such as those Choi 
would impose on unsophisticated investors.208 Rather, investors would be 
subject to restrictions only if they do not have appropriate financial 
sophistication or fail to educate themselves, such that they fail the 
licensing exam. Of course, just as with Choi’s licensing scheme,209 my 
proposal may be vulnerable to error. For example, an investor may be 
subjected to unwarranted or unwanted restrictions due to testing error, or 
 
 
 208. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text. Choi determines that an alternative investor 
classification scheme is necessary because the current federal securities regime is too restrictive. See 
Choi, supra note 23, at 280–81. But Choi’s alternative investor classification scheme still subjects 
investors to unwanted restrictions, such as allowing unsophisticated investors to transact only in 
passive index mutual funds. Id. at 301. 
 209. Id. at 313. 
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an investor may fail to pass the licensing exam, even though he or she is 
financially knowledgeable. However, it is unlikely that scoring error 
would play so prominent a role as to make the licensing scheme 
unreasonable.210 Additionally, should an investor fail to pass the licensing 
exam even though he or she is financially knowledgeable, he or she may 
retake the exam at a later date.  
My proposed licensing scheme does not suffer from the problem of 
potentially untrustworthy or unknowledgeable informational resources, as 
does Choi’s knowledge-based investor classification scheme.211 Here, 
investors are not dependent on intermediaries as they are within Choi’s 
scheme.212 Investors may choose to rely upon an intermediary once they 
have passed the licensing exam, in which case the same concerns present 
in Choi’s investor classification scheme would be relevant. But 
presumably, because these investors have passed an exam which tests 
financial sophistication, such investors would be knowledgeable enough to 
avoid being victimized by con artists.  
Additionally, unlike Fletcher’s sophistication factors,213 my proposed 
licensing scheme presents a realistic, quantifiable gauge of sophistication. 
Exam scores would be calculated by computer, and accreditation would be 
measured by a passing score of seventy percent. Also, under this scheme, 
the Commission would not be relying upon a purchaser honor system, 
wherein investors attest to how much financial television programming 
they watch.214 While there is room for computer error under the proposed 
licensing scheme, there would not be room for human manipulation via 
dishonesty as there would be with a purchaser honor system.  
Unlike Friedman’s proposal for increased emphasis on broker-dealer 
regulation,215 which covers only those investors who utilize brokers, my 
proposed licensing scheme is more far reaching in scope, covering all 
potential investors regardless of their choice to utilize a broker.  
 
 
 210. During the summer of 2007, several people taking the New York State Bar Exam 
experienced technical difficulties. See Huliq News, New York Bar Exam Results, available at 
http://www.huliq.com/42128/new-york-bar-exam-results (last visited Jan. 3, 2009). Such technical 
difficulties have not derailed the future administration of the New York State Bar Exam. 
 211. See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.  
 212. See Choi, supra note 23, at 301. Under Choi’s investor classification scheme, intermediary-
level investors are required to associate with appropriate intermediaries, who may not be trustworthy, 
unfaithful or negligent in their screening duties. Id. at 290, 295–96.  
 213. See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.  
 214. See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text. Some of Fletcher’s sophistication factors are 
problematic because there are no realistic means for the Commission to measure these factors, beyond 
the possibility of a purchaser honor system, which is vulnerable to fraud. See supra note 175 and 
accompanying text.  
 215. See supra notes 155–59 and accompanying text.  
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Finally, my proposed licensing scheme avoids the untenable suggestion 
implicit in Choi’s self-tailored investor regulation system that the current 
federal securities regime be dismantled.216 My scheme merely supplements 
the existing federal securities regime. Such a licensing scheme would 
permit the Commission to maintain its useful regulatory rules, such as 
Rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act, which protects holders of securities 
against fraud or deceit in the purchase or sale of securities.217  
D. Potential Criticisms of the Proposed Licensing Scheme 
As with Choi’s licensing scheme,218 there are administrative costs and 
complexities inherent in such a system. There would be administrative 
costs involved with designing the exam and the educational materials used 
to prepare for it. There would also be costs involved with administering 
the exam: testing centers would need to be created, testing computers 
would need to be purchased, and test proctors would need to be hired. But, 
the efficiency gains associated with licensing financially sophisticated 
individuals far outweigh the administrative costs of the current accredited 
investor definition, which likely include costly fraud proceedings against 
con artists and the simple costs of honest mistakes made by uneducated 
investors who are in over their heads.  
Additionally, there would be opportunity costs associated with such a 
licensing scheme. Investors would have to forego purchasing activity 
while they expend time preparing for the licensing exam. However, if 
investors are financially knowledgeable, preparation time should be 
minimal, and if investors are not financially knowledgeable, then any time 
spent preparing for the exam rather than recklessly investing is time well 
spent.  
Another potential criticism is that investors would study for the exam 
to pass, rather than to gain financial acumen. It is possible that, much like 
the SAT test prep industry prepares students to take a test, rather than 
educating them on broader concepts, the accredited and unaccredited 
licensing exam test-preparation industry would do the same. In such a 
scenario, investors would not increase their understanding of the financial 
markets, securities regulation, and the private offering exemption under 
Regulation D, but instead would learn just enough about the particulars to 
pass the exam. To the extent this is true, such investors might remain 
 
 
 216. See supra notes 184–85 and accompanying text.  
 217. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
 218. See Choi, supra note 23, at 312–13.  
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vulnerable to the risks and abuses of the system that the Commission has 
sought to protect them from. To combat this concern, the Commission 
could take care in designing the tests, making sure to include a broad 
range of concepts and question types. By testing a wide range of subjects, 
using different question formats, it would be hard for the test prep industry 
to come up with a stock course specifically for the licensing exams. 
Rather, the test prep industry would be forced to create a course which 
teaches all of the different subjects covered on the exam, which would 
ensure that investors truly are gaining financial knowledge by reviewing 
for the exam.  
Currently, Rule 506 permits issuers to include up to thirty-five 
unaccredited investors in their offerings. In practice, however, funds rarely 
include such unaccredited investors, because the burden of disseminating 
the required disclosure to these unaccredited investors often outweighs the 
benefit gained from inclusion.219 Such a de facto exclusion could occur 
under my proposed licensing regime, as well. For example, private 
investment vehicles could establish an investment minimum that would be 
cost prohibitive to purchasers capable of investing only a small amount. 
Thus, even though individuals who pass the unaccredited licensing exam 
would be accredited, hedge funds could nonetheless exclude these 
investors.  
While these criticisms and concerns are relevant, they are not 
insurmountable and should not deter the Commission from adopting the 
proposed licensing scheme discussed here. Any accreditation regime 
would be subject to inherent criticism and concerns. People will be 
excluded who should not be, and likewise, people will be included who 
should not be. However, the benefits of having a financially sophisticated 
accredited investor counterbalance these concerns. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Recent proposed revisions to the current accredited investor definition 
for natural persons and the exponential growth of the hedge fund industry 
make it clear that a review of the accredited investor definition for natural 
persons is relevant and that adjustments are necessary. While legal 
 
 
 219. While Rule 505 and Rule 506 allow for issuers to issue their interests to up to thirty-five 
unaccredited investors, the Commission recognized that in practice, “most hedge funds sell only to 
investors whose wealth exceeds that required to meet the standard established for accredited investor 
status.” SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 25, at x. For additional information regarding Rules 505 and 
506, see supra note 57.  
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scholars have proposed wholesale alternatives to the current accredited 
investor definition, the SEC should adopt a hybrid licensing scheme to 
supplement the current accredited investor definition rather than replace it. 
Such a proposal is in line with the Commission’s objective to create a 
clear, bright-line standard that increases investor protection and 
encourages investor education. However, it may result in administrative 
costs and opportunity costs, and it may not work perfectly in practice 
because private investment vehicles may still exclude small investors. 
While such a proposal may result in certain new costs and may be 
incomplete in alleviating the ills of the current system, it may just be the 
“least imperfect” solution to a pressing problem and should be embraced 
by the Commission. 
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